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Abstract 
During the last decade, outsourcing has emerged as a major strategic alternative in 
information systems management. Although various outsourcing strategies have been 
appeared, most of studies have focused on one or two dimensions of outsourcing strategies 
without consideration of their combination effects. Being perhaps the first attempt, this 
exploratory study identifies major four dimensions for outsourcing strategy, and seeks to 
examine the concept of fit or congruence to describe the nature of the interrelationships 
among them using a Korean sample. The results of cluster analysis support the notion of 
gestalt fit by grouping six clusters. The results also suggest that organizations in congruent 
groups (clusters one, two, and six) appear to realize a greater degree of outsourcing success 
than those in non-congruent groups (clusters three, four, and five). Interestingly, cluster six 
(total outsourcing based on long-term partnership with multiple vendors) displays the highest 
outsourcing achievement among them.  
 
Keywords: Outsourcing Strategy, Outsourcing Success, Fit or Congruence, Cluster Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Information Technology (IT) outsourcing is one of the major issues of facing 
organizations in today. According to the International Data Center, the worldwide 
outsourcing market size is estimated to rise from $100 billion in 1998 to $152 billion by 2005, 
with an annual growth rate of 12.2%. With this kind of growth, IT outsourcing warrants top-
level attention. However, the decision to outsource IT functions is not an easy task. This is 
because outsourcing can have a profound and far-reaching impact on an organization’s 
market share and its technical leadership. That is, outsourcing is not just an operational 
decision but a strategic one with far-reaching consequences.  
When a company decides whether to outsource or not, the company has to carry out an 
assessment of the existing IT resources and capabilities. If existing information technology 
capabilities are limited and economies of scale may accrue, then outsourcing makes sense. If 
the company decides to outsource, the outsourcing strategic details must be selected as the 
following questions: Should outsourcing include all information services or just a few of the 
services?; Should outsourcing relationship be a contractual or partnership-based?; Should the 
period of outsourcing be long- or short-term?; and Should the number of vendor for 
outsourcing be a single or multi-vendor?  
The success of outsourcing requires a set of processes for effectively formulating 
outsourcing strategies in the early stage. However, deciding the degree of outsourcing, 
seeking a contractual or partnership relationship, entering into a long-term or short-term 
outsourcing, or selecting a single or multi-vendor are not simplistic strategic options. This is 
because these factors must be considered in conjunction with one another and other 
organizational factors. Although some research has begun to examine the effective 
outsourcing strategies (Lacity and Willcocks, 1998; Saunders, Gebelt and Hu, 1997), most of 
studies have focused on one or two dimensions of outsourcing strategies without 
consideration of their combination effects. In short, adequate guidelines for organizing 
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effective outsourcing strategies do not exist. Furthermore, no large scale empirical study 
exists in the outsourcing literature that explores the fit between the relevant outsourcing 
strategies and its success.  
The objective of this study is to examine how the concept of fit can be applied to 
complex outsourcing strategies. Specifically, this study focuses on the nature of 
interrelationships among four outsourcing strategies and their impacts on outsourcing success. 
These four outsourcing strategies include; degree of outsourcing – total or selective 
outsourcing; relationship type – contractual or partnership relationship; period of outsourcing 
– long-term or short-term outsourcing; and number of vendor – single or multiple vendors 
outsourcing. I expect that congruence among these four strategies will enable organizations to 
reap greater outsourcing benefits and propose a number of congruent combinations. In this 
study, cluster analysis is used to identify groups of organizations that share common features 
along the four outsourcing strategies. This analysis method is most useful for examining fit 
among a number of variables.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework  
 
The success of outsourcing can manifest in several different ways. Success may be 
reflected by the degree to which predefined objectives are realized. In most outsourcing cases, 
outsourcing objectives relate to the strategic, economic and technological benefits. Then the 
success of outsourcing should be assessed in terms of attainment of theses benefits (Loh and 
Venkatraman, 1992). Such objectives include outsourced system’s efficiency, user and 
business satisfaction for outsourced systems, service quality, cost reduction, etc. (Arnett and 
Jones, 1994; Benko, 1993; Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1996; Lacity and Hirschhein, 1993; Lee 
and Kim, 1999).  
As the scope and complexity of outsourcing projects expand, the importance of well-
organized outsourcing strategy developed in the initial stage has been on the rise. The limited 
amount of research in this area suggests that typical outsourcing strategies that could affect 
outsourcing success include degree of outsourcing, relationship type, period of outsourcing, 
and number of vendor as described in the following sections (Lacity and Hirschhein, 1993; 
Ngwengyama and Bryson, 1999; Pinnington and Woolcock, 1995; Willcocks, Lacity and 
Fitzgerald, 1995).  
 
2.1 Degree of Outsourcing 
What is the optimal degree of outsourcing for our organization? Companies make their 
outsourcing decisions for many reasons, ranging from a simple focus on cost reduction to the 
improvement of business performance. Broadly, outsourcing decision can be viewed as being 
either efficiency-based or politically driven (Aubert, Rivard and Patry, 1996; Smith, Mitra, 
and Narasimhan, 1998). The driving force behind the efficiency-based perspective is to 
maximize profits or to minimize costs when deciding outsourcing options. For the political 
motivation, outsourcing decisions are motivated by difficulties in managing IT functions such 
as the lack of efficiency of IT department, the low quality of services, the difficult of 
improving business performance using current IT functions, etc.  
Based on the motivation of outsourcing, organizations may decide their possible 
candidates and suitable amount for outsourcing. Some IT activities are critical contributors to 
business operations (core functions), whereas others merely provide necessary functions 
(commodity functions). Both the core and commodity functions can be evaluated for 
organizational outsourcing potential (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). The identification of the 
functions that organizations wish to outsource can be done by considering whether a 
particular activity is critical to our value chain or our desired competitive focus.  
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For instance, some companies contribute their resources on a set of core functions and 
strategically outsource other functions (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994), while some may outsource 
their core functions because they lack the talent and skills to develop potential core 
differentiating applications (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). Specifically, organizations may 
choose total outsourcing strategy, selective outsourcing strategy, or total insourcing strategy 
(Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). However, there is no exact answer about which functions are 
appropriate candidates for outsourcing and what extent of outsourcing is optimal for an 
organization. By understanding the outsourcing motivation coupling with business and IT 
strategies, organizations should decide the optimal outsourcing scope, which lead to best 
achieve the success of outsourcing. 
 
2.2 Relationship Type 
What kind of outsourcing relationship is appropriate for our organization? Many 
different types of contracts are used to govern IT outsourcing relationships between the 
service receiver and provider. Basically, IT outsourcing relationship can be categorized three 
major types: fee-for-service contract; partnership; and buy-in contract (Lacity and Willcocks, 
1998). Fee-for-service contract represents that a service receiver pays a fee to a service 
provider in exchange for the management and delivery of specified IT products or services. 
Partnership is the collaboration interorganizational relationships involving significant 
resources of two or more organizations to create, add to, or maximize their joint value, while 
buy-in contract indicates that a service receiver buys in vendor resources to supplement in-
house capabilities but the vendor resources are managed by in-house business and IT 
management. 
For example, some companies are opting to establish partnerships with their service 
providers based on long-term commitments that allows firms to share risks and benefits and 
to better manage complex outsourcing relationships (Diromualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998). 
Some studies, however, insist that outsourcing providers cannot be strategic partners because 
they do not share the profit (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993). Further, the nature of partnership 
on outsourcing is something different because outsourcing relationship itself includes the 
hierarchical relationship based on contract (Saunders, Gebelt and Hu, 1997). Thus, 
partnership might only be appropriate under conditions of high uncertainty when flexible 
contracts and a good working relationship become important (Fitzgerald and Willcocks, 
1994).  
We should keep in mind that the achievement of outsourcing is not assured and all 
relationship between the service receiver and provider are always subject to dissolution. Thus, 
the relationship with the service provider must be aligned with the strategic intent underlying 
the outsourcing initiative. The best way to minimize the risk of outsourcing failure is to 
develop an appropriate outsourcing relationship with the service provider in accordance with 
the outsourcing objective. That is, management must choose the appropriate relationship type 
and successfully implement and sustain it if outsourcing is to succeed. 
 
2.3 Period of Outsourcing 
Which one is better for our organization, long- or short-term outsourcing? To this 
question, the results of the previous studies and practices show conflicting conclusions. Some 
prefer long-term outsourcing whereas others pursue short-term outsourcing. A long-term 
contract improves financial predictability and reduces the risk and uncertainties associated 
with the important business functions (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995; Martinsons, 1993). This in 
turn reduces the superfluous complexity and bureaucracy of the service receiver and reassigns 
internal staff from mundane operational tasks to value-added functions. On the contrary, a 
short-term contract allows companies to adequately analyze the cost implications of their 
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outsourcing decision, to motivate vendor performance because vendors realize the service 
receiver could switch vendors when the contract expired, and to recover faster from mistakes 
(Lacity and Willcocks, 1998).  
In the past, outsourcing duration had been associated with both outsourcing type and 
scope. When an organization decided a contractual and selective outsourcing, it was natural 
that the outsourcing project was based on short-term or mid-term contract (Lacity, Willcocks, 
and Feeny, 1996). On the other hand, long-term contracts resulted from partnership 
relationship based on mutual trust (Lee and Kim, 1999; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). 
However, these assumptions are gradually changing. For instance, a recent study predicts that 
long-term relationships with a short-term contract will be an emerging practice in the field of 
outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). Even if each party intends for a long-term 
relationship, the original commitment could be a short-term contract with renewable options. 
To survive a long-term contract, it must have mechanisms to allow adjustment to 
circumstances that cannot be fully foreseen at the time the contract is written. Thus, 
organizations should carefully choose an appropriate period of outsourcing coupling with 
their outsourcing objectives and motivations in order to assure the success of outsourcing.  
 
2.4 Number of Vendor 
Which way should we adopt, a single vendor or multi-vendor approach, to minimize 
risks and maximize value through outsourcing? As in Kodak outsourcing case, we can adopt 
multi-vendor strategy (Applegate and Montealegre, 1991), but the most common form is the 
single vendor approach in the field of outsourcing (Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999). 
If so, what are the reasons that some companies contract with a single vendor while 
others contract with several? The use of multi-vendor strategy would low cost, high vendor 
performance and increased bargaining power for the service receiver (Porter, 1985). The 
basic assumption of the multi-vendor outsourcing strategy holds that each vendor is induced 
to provide a high level of performance because the service receiver has a credible threat to 
switch vendors. Having established a relationship with more than one vendor, the service 
receiver can switch or shift business between the vendors without incurring switching cost.  
In the single vendor outsourcing strategy, the service receiver develops a strong 
relationship with one vendor. Although the single vendor strategy leaves a firm open to 
opportunistic bargaining and performance failure vulnerability, some have argued that it can 
be effective in developing a highly integrated long-term relationship with a single vendor 
(Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999). Since poor vendor performance is the result of poor 
communication and coordination, it is more costly to monitor and coordinate the activities of 
multiple vendors than for a single vendor.  
In sum, the single vendor outsourcing can minimize performance assurance costs and 
then total cost and maximize switching cost, whereas multi-vendor outsourcing strategy can 
minimize switching cost but maximize the difficulty of communication with vendors. Even if 
the number of vendor is considered important in outsourcing decision, few have investigated 
this issue in outsourcing context. With other three outsourcing strategies, organizations have 
to seriously think about it, and make a decision in accordance with firms’ outsourcing 
objective and motive to reap the greatest outsourcing benefit.   
 
2.5 Pattern of Outsourcing Strategies 
Some firms have achieved success with their outsourcing strategies, but others have been 
dismal failures. An empirical study found that in 53 out of 61 outsourcing cases, managers 
reported an unsatisfactory outcome (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993). One explanation for some 
of the failure is the complexity of outsourcing transactions because outsourcing decisions 
involve many factors such as balancing the needs of different organizational functions, 
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establishing and managing a relationship, and making a decision with incomplete information 
(Loh and Venkatraman, 1992). Another explanation that has been given for outsourcing 
failures is the limited selection of decision models to help managers systematically analyze 
outsourcing decisions (Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999) 
While some firms have achieved varying degrees of outsourcing success with any of 
these strategies, many have encountered significant difficulties. A wrong decision can result 
in loss of competencies and capabilities, exposure to unexpected risks, and business failures. 
In spite of the fact, no studies have been done to guide what effective combinations exist 
among various outsourcing strategies. In this study, I try to empirically find some patterns of 
outsourcing strategies and which patterns are expected to be associated with greater 
outsourcing success. Hence, this study proposes that the success of outsourcing depends on 
the proper fit among these four strategic dimensions. A model describing such congruence is 
shown in figure 1.      
 
Relationship
Type
Degree of 
Outsourcing
Period of
Outsourcing
Number of 
Vendors
Fit
Outsourcing
Success
 
Figure 1.  A model of fit between outsourcing strategies and its success 
  
The notion of congruence reflected in the proposed model suggests that an outsourcing 
decision within these four strategies affects the extent of outsourcing success. For instance, 
when an organization strategically pursues total outsourcing, the need for coordination and 
control of outsourcing transactions is much higher. In such a context, it appears prudent in 
building a partnership with preferred service providers to minimize future uncertainty and 
maximize its value. Also, the partnership implies forming a mutually beneficial relationship 
with competent vendors based on trust, while being considered in the context of long range 
planning. Furthermore, in such an environment, it appears logical to use multiple vendors for 
outsourcing in order to maximize utilizing each vendor’s expertise and human and technical 
resources through efficient combinations of several external vendors, and to increase market 
opportunities and relationship safety. This leads a total outsourcing, partnership, long-term 
and multi-vendor strategy. 
On the other hand, if the selective outsourcing strategy is selected, then the need for 
coordination and control of outsourcing relationships is low relative to total outsourcing. The 
need for detailed fee-for-service contract including service levels, measures of performance, 
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penalties for non-performance, the decrease of IT budget after the given period, or business 
requirements is much higher. In such an environment, organizations try to make mid-term 
contracts for 4 to 7 years. The reason is that they may not have a long-term technology and 
business requirements, which lead not to fully describe specified requirements in contract. 
Additionally, in these conditions, companies want to develop a strong relationship and to 
communicate intensively and effectively with one vendor, not several. In sum, it indicates a 
selective outsourcing, fee-for-service contract, mid-term, and single vendor strategy.  
Finally, in case of that an organization decides total insourcing strategy, the need for 
coordination and control of outsourcing relationship is nearly not necessary compared to the 
total and selective outsourcing. In such a context, since organizations decide to retain most of 
the management and provision for IT services internally and the scope of outsourcing is 
relatively small, they try to make a short-term contract with a single competent vendor. Firms 
in these conditions will select a total insourcing, buy-in contract, short-term, and single 
vendor strategy. 
However, not all organizations achieve congruence among all of the four outsourcing 
strategies. For instance, consider an organization with a total outsourcing, buy-in and long-
term contract with several vendors. While there is congruency among three strategies, this 
outsourcing strategy is non-congruent with partnership relationship. Although this firm will 
be able to function, it is easy that the non-congruence will lead to considerable inefficiencies 
in responding to outsourcing initiatives for maximizing the joint value among participants. 
Hence, three types of outsourcing strategies are likely to lead to greater outsourcing success. 
With these three outsourcing strategies, there may be other congruent combinations, while 
various type of non-congruence may also exist which can hamper the success of outsourcing.  
Thus, I posit that the congruent combinations of four outsourcing strategies are expected 
to be associated with the success of outsourcing. Such a view is in accordance with the notion 
of fit as a gestalt (Venkatraman, 1989). The following proposition is proposed: 
 
Organizations with congruent combinations of the four outsourcing 
strategies - degree of outsourcing, relationship type, period of outsourcing, 
and number of vendor – will show greater outsourcing success than those 
without such congruence.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Measures 
The survey instrument was developed based on the construct that have already been used 
and validated by other researchers. This study employed objective measures for four 
outsourcing strategies and perceptual measures for outsourcing success. In particular, the 
degree of outsourcing was measured by the actual amount of the outsourcing as a percentage 
of total IT budget  - total outsourcing (more than 80%), selective outsourcing (20 to 80%), 
total insourcing (less than 20%) - in each organization (Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1996), 
while actual data were required for the period of outsourcing and number of vendor.  
The relationship type can be categorized into major three types – fee-for-service contract 
(1 to 4), partnership (5), and buy-in contract (6) (Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). Further, fee-
for service contract can divide into four contract types such as standard contracts (1), detailed 
contracts (2), loose contracts (3), and mixed contracts (4). For the relationship type, 
respondents were asked to select one among above assigned numbers from 1 to 6 based on 
their outsourcing contracts. Finally, to examine the impact of fit among four outsourcing 
strategies, Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996)’s instrument was adopted to assess the degree of 
achieving outsourcing benefits such as focusing on core business, IT competence, skilled 
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personnel, economies of scale in human and technical resources, control of IT expenses, 
avoidance of obsolescence risk, accessing to key IT, and overall satisfaction. 
An initial version of the survey instrument was subsequently refined through extensive 
pretesting with seven academics having significant expertise in outsourcing. The instrument 
was further pilot tested with fifteen organizations in Korea that have outsourced their IT 
functions to external service providers. I interviewed a CIO and a representative in charge of 
the firm’s IT operations in each organization in Seoul, Korea. The multiple phases of 
instrument development resulted in a significant degree of refinement and restructuring of the 
survey instrument as well as establishing the initial face validity and internal validity 
(Nunnally, 1978). 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Measurement Reliability 
Data were collected from organizations in Korea through a survey instrument. Since 
larger organizations are more likely to have outsourcing experiences, Annual Corporation 
Reports’ 1,000 companies published by Maeil Business Newspaper (1999), which is the 
leading economic daily newspaper in Korea, served as the target population. These firms 
were checked in the Book of Listed Firms published by the Korea Stock Exchange to obtain 
the name of the CIO in each firm. Finally, the survey questionnaire was personally addressed 
to 1,000 CIOs of the firms.  
 
Table 1. The profile of responding companies 
(a) Industry 
Industry Type Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing 81 26.0 
Banking/Finance/ 
Insurance 
65 20.9 
Distribution 45 14.5 
Construction 40 12.9 
Transport/Warehousing/ 
Communication 
32 10.3 
Research 25 8.0 
Information Technology 23 7.4 
Unanswered 0 0 
Total 311 100 
 
(c) Total sales revenue 
Range Frequency Percent 
Less than $50 million 38 12.2 
$50 - $100 million 42 13.5 
$100 - $500 million 85 27.3 
$500 - $1 billion 33 10.6 
$1 - $5 billion 47 15.1 
$5 - $10 billion 26 8.4 
$10 billion and above 24 7.7 
Unanswered 16 5.2 
Total 311 100 
 
(b) Number of total employees 
Range Frequency Percent 
Less than 100 31 10.0 
100 – 200 28 9.0 
201 – 500 40 12.9 
501 - 1,000 49 15.7 
1,001 - 3,000 62 19.9 
3,001 - 5,000 38 12.2 
5,001 - 10,000 27 8.7 
10,001 - 30,000 18 5.8 
30,001 and above 10 3.2 
Unanswered 8 2.6 
Total 311 100 
 
(d) Type of IT outsourcing 
Type Frequency Percent 
Application development 61 19.6 
Application maintenance 69 22.2 
Data center 35 11.3 
Network 46 14.8 
Desktop 24 7.7 
Help Desk 18 5.8 
IT Consulting 42 13.5 
Unanswered 16 5.1 
Total 311 100 
Following the Total Design Method of Dillman (1991), to increase the response rate, a 
post-card follow-up was conducted one week after the original mailing, and the same 
questionnaire was mailed again four and seven weeks after the original mailing. After the 
four rounds of solicitation, a total of 390 responses were received, providing a response rate 
of 39%. Among them, 54 responses that did not have an IT outsourcing arrangement were 
discarded, 25 responses were removed from analysis due to incomplete data, and 311 
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responses could be used for the final analysis. The respondent characteristics are summarized 
in Table 1.  
Content validity of the survey instrument was established through the adoption of 
standard instruments, suggestions in the literature, and pretesting with experts in the field of 
outsourcing (Kerlinger, 1986). Since measures of outsourcing strategies tried to gather fact 
data from respondents using one question, I did not need to do any reliability and validity 
tests for them. Outsourcing success was measured by the perception of CIOs about their 
outsourcing projects using nine items. Hence, factor analysis was conducted to check the 
unidimensionality of the items. There were no items with a factor loading lower than 0.5, the 
factor loadings ranged from 0.805 to 0.883, and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) was 
0.946, which was acceptable.  
 
4. Analyses and Findings 
 
 
4.1 Method of Analysis 
The fit (or congruence) among the four outsourcing strategies can be considered within a 
multivariate perspective as one of gestalt rather than one of a bivariate fit between each pair 
of factors. As proposed in the conceptual model, the congruence among outsourcing 
strategies is expected to be related to the success of outsourcing. To examine such a fit, the 
most appropriate statistical technique is cluster analysis (Venkatraman, 1989), which is a 
technique for grouping objects based on the characteristics they possess into some groups. 
Cluster analysis differs from discriminant analysis primarily because of the data inductive 
approach in deriving the number and attributes of the groups (or clusters) that are not known 
prior to the analysis (Hair et al., 1995). It must be noted that this statistical technique is 
exploratory in nature. In cluster analysis, the resulting groups (or clusters) should show high 
internal homogeneity and high external heterogeneity. This study used the K-Means 
clustering technique using the Quick Cluster routine produced by SPSS 10.0 software.  
 
4.2 Testing Results 
To derive a parsimonious set of clusters that could be clearly distinguished from one 
another, this study tried to extract a different set of clusters consisting of two, three, four, five, 
six, and seven groups using different options such as Euclidean and Mahalanobis distance. To 
assess the distinctiveness of each cluster, equality of variable means between the clusters was 
tested by the F-test. Finally, a six-cluster solution was selected based on the results of F-test. 
Table 2 shows means and standard deviations of each variable in the six clusters from column 
2 to 7. In column 8, F-value and the level of its significance related to the test result for 
equality of variable means between clusters are shown, while the last column shows the result 
of the significant pair of clusters between the variable means tested by Dunnett’s Multiple 
Range.  
As in Table 2, both the F-tests and the results of tests of significance of pairwise contrasts 
explain that the group means of these six clusters are significantly different. Clusters one, two, 
and six appear to be internally congruent while the remaining three clusters are non-
congruent. Cluster one represents a group of firms with total insourcing (less than 20%), buy-
in contract (almost 6), short-term period (less than 4 years), and single vendor strategies. 
Cluster two shows a firm group with selective outsourcing (20 to 80%), fee-for-service 
contract (detail contract (2) or loose contract (3)), mid-term period (4 to 7 years), and single 
vendor strategies. Cluster six, which is opposite characteristics against the group one, 
represents a group of firms with total outsourcing (more than 80%), partnership (5), long-
term period (more than 7 years), and multi-vendor strategies.   
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Table 2. The result of cluster analysis: Six clusters 
Cluster Groups; Mean (S.D.) 
Congruent Groups Non-Congruent Groups Variables Group 1 
(n=52) 
Group 2 
(n=48) 
Group 6 
(n=54) 
Group 3 
(n=51) 
Group 4 
(n=48) 
Group 5 
(n=58) 
F (df, sig.) Dunnett Multiple  Range Test 
Degree of 
Outsourcing 
7.81 (3.06) 54.79 (5.35) 95.44 (4.65) 19.31 (2.30) 41.10 (2.06) 80.17 (4.66) 4027.83 (5, 0.00)*** 1-2****; 1-3****; 1-4****; 1-5****;  
1-6****; 2-3****; 2-4****; 2-5****;  
2-6****; 3-4****; 3-5****; 3-6****;  
4-5****; 4-6****; 5-6****   
Relationship 
Type 
5.92 (0.55) 2.42 (1.14) 4.76 (0.58) 3.06 (2.23) 3.12 (1.76) 4.05 (0.94) 47.92 (5, 0.00)*** 1-2****; 1-3****; 1-4****; 1-5****;  
1-6****; 2-5****; 2-6****; 3-5*; 3-6****; 
4-5**; 4-6****; 5-6**** 
Period of 
Outsourcing 
1.86 (0.79) 4.54 (0.92) 7.76 (2.05) 4.29 (1.30) 3.35 (0.98) 6.39 (2.02) 109.63 (5, 0.00)*** 1-2****; 1-3****; 1-4****; 1-5****;  
1-6****; 2-4****; 2-5****; 2-6****; 3-4****; 
3-5****; 3-6****; 4-5****; 4-6****; 5-6****  
Number of 
Vendor 
1.00 (0.00) 1.06 (0.24) 2.29 (0.77) 1.00 (0.00) 1.06 (0.24) 1.39 (0.53) 79.45 (5, 0.00)*** 1-5****; 1-6****; 2-5****; 2-6****; 3-5****; 
3-6****; 4-5****; 4-6****; 5-6**** 
****p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
 
Table 3. The summary of cluster analysis: Four outsourcing strategies 
Cluster Groups; Mean (S.D.) 
Congruent Groups Non-Congruent Groups Variables Group 1 
(n=52) 
Group 2 
(n=48) 
Group 6 
(n=54) 
Group 3 
(n=51) 
Group 4 
(n=48) 
Group 5 
(n=58) 
Degree of Outsourcing Total insourcing Selective outsourcing Total outsourcing Total insourcing Selective outsourcing Total outsourcing 
Relationship Type Buy-in-contract Fee-for-service Partnership Fee-for-service Fee-for-service Fee-for-service 
Period of Outsourcing Short-term Mid-term Long-term Mid-term Short-term Mid-term 
Number of Vendor Single vendor Single vendor Multi vendors Single vendor Single vendor Single vendor 
. Bold and Italic Font in Group 3, 4, and 5 shows non-congruent outsourcing strategies 
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Table 4. One-way ANOVA across six cluster groups for outsourcing success 
Cluster Groups; Mean (S.D.) 
Congruent Groups Non-Congruent Groups Dependent 
Variables Group 1 
(n=52) 
Group 2 
(n=48) 
Group 6 
(n=54) 
Group 3 
(n=51) 
Group 4 
(n=48) 
Group 5 
(n=58) 
F (df, sig.) Dunnett Multiple  Range Test 
Outsourcing Success a 
1. Focus on core  
    business 
2. IT competence 
 
3. Skilled personnel 
 
4. Economies of scale  
    in human resources 
5. Economies of scale  
    in technical resources 
6. Control of IT  
    expenses 
7. Avoidance of  
    obsolescence risk 
8. Access to key IT 
 
9. Overall satisfaction 
 
4.84 (0.75) 
 
4.90 (0.82) 
 
4.81 (0.84) 
 
5.06 (0.85) 
 
4.94 (0.87) 
 
4.86 (0.91) 
 
5.03 (0.81) 
 
5.02 (0.85) 
 
5.00 (0.71) 
 
4.93 (0.88) 
 
4.89 (0.83) 
 
5.04 (0.74) 
 
4.79 (0.87) 
 
5.00 (0.82) 
 
4.91 (0.85) 
 
4.98 (0.89) 
 
4.83 (0.81) 
 
4.89 (0.80) 
 
5.12 (0.89) 
 
5.18 (0.78) 
 
5.14 (0.90) 
 
5.12 (1.10) 
 
4.98 (0.86) 
 
4.90 (0.83) 
 
5.07 (0.95) 
 
5.00 (1.01) 
 
5.09 (0.94) 
 
4.50 (0.97) 
 
4.76 (0.95) 
 
4.72 (0.80) 
 
4.43 (0.96) 
 
4.39 (1.02) 
 
4.33 (0.95) 
 
4.55 (1.02) 
 
4.62 (1.04) 
 
4.57 (0.85) 
 
4.25 (0.84) 
 
4.50 (0.87) 
 
4.50 (1.03) 
 
4.62 (1.08) 
 
4.44 (1.11) 
 
4.37 (0.98) 
 
4.52 (0.87) 
 
4.42 (0.92) 
 
4.44 (0.87) 
 
4.41 (0.95) 
 
4.67 (0.84) 
 
4.50 (0.99) 
 
4.50 (1.25) 
 
4.24 (0.96) 
 
4.31 (0.96) 
 
4.27 (0.81) 
 
4.34 (0.87) 
 
4.40 (0.88) 
 
7.64 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
3.91 (5, 0.00)** 
 
4.79 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
4.16 (5, 0.00)** 
 
7.05 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
5.84 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
7.49 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
5.30 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
6.70 (5, 0.00)*** 
 
1-4**; 2-4**; 2-5*; 3-6**; 4-6****; 5-6**** 
 
4-6***; 5-6** 
 
2-4*; 2-5**; 4-6**; 5-6*** 
 
1-3**; 1-5*; 3-6**; 5-6* 
 
1-3*; 1-5***; 2-3**; 2-4*; 2-5****; 3-6**; 5-6*** 
1-3*; 1-5**; 2-3**; 2-4*; 2-5**; 3-6**;  
4-6*; 5-6*** 
1-4**; 1-5****; 2-5***; 4-6**; 5-6**** 
 
1-4**; 1-5****; 2-5**; 4-6**; 5-6*** 
 
1-4***; 1-5***; 2-5**; 3-6**; 4-6***; 5-6**** 
Overall Outsourcing 
Success 
4.94 (0.69) 4.92 (0.70) 5.07 (0.76) 4.54 (0.80) 4.45 (0.80) 4.41 (0.72) 7.79 (5, 0.00)*** 1-4**; 1-5***; 2-4**; 2-5***; 3-6**; 4-6***; 5-6**** 
a The measure employs a seven-point-Likert scale from “extremely low” to “extremely high”    
****p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
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Further, table 2 shows that three groups - clusters three, four, and five – depict firms with 
varying levels or types of non-congruence among outsourcing strategies. Cluster three firms 
pursue total insourcing, fee-for-service contract, mid-term period, and single vendor 
strategies. Whereas total insourcing and single vendor strategies are congruent, this pattern is 
non-congruent with free-for-service contract and mid-term period. Cluster four displays 
selective outsourcing, fee-for-service contract, and single vendor strategies, which fits with 
the mid-term period of outsourcing. However, these firms exhibit the short-term outsourcing 
period leading to a fair degree of non-congruence. Cluster five represents total outsourcing, 
fee-for-service contract, mid-term period and single vendor strategies. The source of non-
congruency for firms in this cluster is their total outsourcing strategies. Table 3 presents the 
summary of cluster analysis in terms of the four outsourcing strategies. 
The objective of this study was that organizations with congruent outsourcing strategies 
would achieve greater outsourcing benefits than those organizations that lack of such 
congruence. To do so, one-way ANOVA was used to assess for the differences of 
outsourcing performance among the six clusters. In terms of both nine items to measure the 
degree of achieving outsourcing benefits and their summates, the results are shown in Table 4. 
Columns 2 to 7 display the mean values and the standard deviations of respective outsourcing 
success measures for each of the six clusters. Column 8 exhibits the F-values, degree of 
freedom, and significance levels. In columns 9, clusters where the mean values are 
significantly different from each other are identified and shown.  
As in Table 4, the results appear to fully uphold the central thesis of the study. The F-
tests indicate that the group means of these six clusters are significantly different on all 
composite measures of outsourcing benefits. Moreover, the group means also significantly 
different on the overall outsourcing success. Clusters one, two, and six, which displayed a 
high congruency among the four outsourcing strategies, appear to have realized high levels of 
outsourcing success. In other word, these firms in the three clusters show higher mean ratings 
on all measures of outsourcing benefits as well as overall outsourcing success. Among them, 
cluster six displays the highest level of meaning ratings on the measures of outsourcing 
benefits except economies of scale in technical resources (highest in cluster two), control of 
IT expenses (highest in cluster two), and access to key IT (highest in cluster one). In contrast, 
firms represented by the remaining three non-congruent clusters (three, four, and five) 
generally represent lower levels for achieving outsourcing benefits.  
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
 
According to the results obtained from cluster analysis, organizations (clusters one, two, 
six) with internally congruent combinations of four outsourcing strategies show greater 
outsourcing success than those (clusters three, four, five) without such congruence, which 
strongly supports the proposed proposition.  
Cluster one represented firms with low-range IT outsourcing. Firms in this cluster want 
to internally retain most of the management responsibility for IT services. Since they buy 
resources from a vendor to supplement in-house capabilities but the resources are managed 
by in-house business and IT management, they need more clear and obvious outsourcing 
strategies like short-term, buy-in contract, and single vendor. With respect to firms in cluster 
two, they pursue mid-range IT outsourcing. In this case, they just want to pay a fee in 
exchange for delivery of specified IT services. Furthermore, the fee-for-service prefers more 
controllable outsourcing contract period (4 to 7 years) and number of vendor (one vendor). 
Organizations represented by cluster six have outsourcing strategies opposite those 
organizations in cluster one. These firms transfer assets, staffs and management 
responsibilities for IT services to their service providers. This permits the long-term 
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beneficial relationship between the service receiver and provider. Moreover, considering 
market opportunities and relationship safety, they combine and utilize several vendors’ 
expertise and resources.  
Overall, clusters one, two and six firms appear to be highly congruent and yet 
strategically different from each other, as indicated in Table 2 and 3. The results further 
indicate that organizations within these clusters have achieved the higher level of outsourcing 
success than non-congruent clusters three, four, and five as indicated in Table 4. The results 
appear to reinforce the concept that the fit or congruence among a set of outsourcing 
strategies yields greater outsourcing.  
The results of this study can be affected by the nature of industry and the size of 
organizations. Therefore, it is discreet to examine the potential effects of such factors on the 
relationship of the fit among the four dimensions of outsourcing strategies and outsourcing 
success. Hence, the study investigated differences among the six clusters in terms of industry 
representation and organizational size. The results indicate that there are no differences 
between the firms in the congruent and non-congruent clusters on these two demographic 
characteristics. Thus, the results of this study are not confounded by these demographics.  
One of the interesting results is that cluster six (total outsourcing, partnership, long-term, 
and multi-vendor) exhibits the highest outsourcing achievement among the three congruent 
groups. It is inconsistent with a recent research conducted by Lacity and Willcocks (1998). 
Their findings were that selective, short-term, and fee-for-service outsourcing decisions 
achieved expected cost savings with a higher relative frequency than other types of 
outsourcing strategies. The divergent result in findings may be caused by different 
perspective. While that study mainly focused on each outsourcing strategy, this study 
examined the fit or congruency among the outsourcing strategies.  
With the increasing attention to IT outsourcing, it is imperative that organizations 
recognize the importance of the congruence among outsourcing strategies to reap the greatest 
outsourcing benefits. Although the previous studies make great contributions for an effective 
outsourcing, they could not provide deep understanding about interrelationship among the 
dimensions of outsourcing strategy since they have primarily focused on each dimension. 
Therefore, the result of this study provides a meaningful guidance model for organizations in 
deciding their outsourcing strategies. Further, the congruent outsourcing strategies identified 
in this study provide organizations with a benchmark against which they can compare their 
current own outsourcing strategies.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this study were to provide meaningful guidelines about outsourcing 
strategies for organizations in terms of degree of outsourcing, relationship type, period of 
outsourcing, and number of vendor by introducing the concept of fit and examining their 
impacts on outsourcing success. The results of this study show that the congruence among the 
four outsourcing strategies enables organizations to achieve greater outsourcing benefits than 
non-congruent combinations. Moreover, among the congruent sets of outsourcing strategies, 
total outsourcing based on partnership relationship with long-term and multiple vendors 
enable organizations to reap the greatest outsourcing achievement.  
A good deal of research has discussed outsourcing strategies, but such studies handled 
one or two dimensions of outsourcing strategies respectively and did not consider their 
combination effects on outsourcing success. Thus, previous research has yielded a variety of 
sometimes conflicting conclusions. Recently, however, many organizations have begun to 
interest in formulating effective outsourcing strategies. In this context, this study is both 
timely and significant. This study is one of earliest attempts to conceptualize fit as gestalt and 
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empirically validate such a view using cluster analysis. However, being exploratory in nature, 
it should be considered as setting the stage for further work in outsourcing domain. 
There are some limitations associated this study. First, this study was restricted to only 
four key dimensions for outsourcing strategies. These are not necessarily the only dimensions 
of importance. Other dimensions can be considered. Second, this study surveyed only the 
CIO of each organization. While having a high level of confidence in the quality of 
information gathered, selection bias could still exist due to the single respondent for the 
antecedent and dependent variables. Finally, the results of this study may include some bias 
since the sample was restricted to Korea. Hence, the results of this study have to be carefully 
interpreted. 
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